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1) Introduction 
In this chapter we will firstly present the problem area, where we will outline the context, which 
our focus stems from. After the presentation of the problem area, the chapter will culminate in 
the presentation of our problem formulation and the related working questions. 
 
 
Problem area 
A dominating idea in the United States of America is the one of the American Dream. Living the 
American Dream takes hard work, but for the citizens in the U.S., it provides a ubiquitous feeling 
of optimism and hope. The opportunity for prosperity, success and moving up the social ladder, 
plays a fundamental role in the American society, and in that, the financial sector plays a vital 
part in the creation of these objectives. One of these vital goals is homeownership. 
In June 2002, President George W. Bush presented a bill, which was designed to ease the process 
for first-time homebuyers. In his speech, Bush pointed out that ownership, with emphasis on 
homeownership, is the foundation of the American Dream: 
I believe when somebody owns their own home, they’re realizing the American Dream. 
They can say it’s my home, it’s nobody else’s home […] (Bush, 2002). 
Subsequently, Bush proclaimed that enabling American citizens to own a house is the objective 
of the U.S. government: The goal is, everybody who wants to own a home has got a shot at doing 
so (Bush, 2002). 
Before the repeal of the renowned Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, investment banks and similar 
financial institutions had been prevented from creating high-risk loan types, such as subprime 
mortgage loans, which main feature are higher interest rates. Moreover, at the time, financial 
institutions did not have any interest in lending money through loans that carried big risk of 
defaulting on debt, because they were directly responsible for their debtors’ repayments and 
thereby, in a case of delay or no payment being made they would have to face the consequences. 
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However, as Glass-Steagall was repealed, it became possible for investment banks and insurance 
companies to merge and enter the mortgage market. [...] The result was an increasingly 
unregulated system in which banks were free to give in fully to the overconfidence to take bigger 
risks (Krugman, 2012, p. 63), and in that way the granting of risky loans became a profitable 
deal with no apparent risk. Suddenly customers with bad credit history were capable of entering 
the housing market, leading to an increase of both housing prices and household debt. This 
process was supported and encouraged by the U.S. government, as George Bush described it: 
 
I called upon the private sector to help us and help the home buyers. We need more 
capital in the private markets for first-time, low-income buyers (Bush, 2002). 
  
What could possibly go wrong? Despite how the U.S. faced repetitive crises, latest in 2000-2002 
where the U.S. stock market crashed due to the dot-com bubble of internet assets, the housing 
market in the U.S. was in rapid development. Loans were increasingly becoming more 
accessible, and it was believed that people should help contribute to the economic growth of the 
nation through borrowing (DeGrace, 2011). As such, the subprime mortgages […] bridged the 
gap between new entrants’ weak incomes and rising home prices (Schwartz, 2009, p. 19). 
Therefore, until 2006 where it peaked, the amount of loans issued grew gradually along with the 
housing prices and all-low interest rate given by the Federal Reserve. During that time credit 
market grew in power and mortgages amounted to colossal sums.  
However, the euphoria of the booming housing market and flourishing house investments did not 
last to fulfill everyone’s hopes and expectations. In 2006, the U.S. housing prices started to 
decline, as they had to reflect the supply and demand, which changed after the housing boom and 
resulted in an enormous number of new houses being built. 
Throughout 2007, the U.S. residential house market collapsed: by the end of 2007 national house 
prices in the U.S. had fallen by over 15% from peak (Shiller Home Price Index). Borrowers who 
did not own large private equity now started to have difficulties with meeting their monthly 
mortgage payments and paying off the loans, which they had taken out during the bubble, when 
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demand for new pricey houses was extraordinary high. Starting from that point, borrowers could 
observe the value of their houses decline 50% or more (Smith, Gjerstad, 2009) while being in an 
enormous debt. As such, homeowners could witness as the value of their houses became smaller 
than of the loans taken on them. 
In April 2007, New Century Financial Corporation, a big subprime lender, announced its 
bankruptcy. In the following months, there were no subprime loans to be given and when four 
months later, in August 2007, during rapid decrease in the interest in loans and therefore 
stagnation in the credit market, another subprime lender – American Home Mortgage also filed 
for bankruptcy, the housing market crash had begun. A crash that would have far-reaching 
international consequences. 
 
The choice of focusing on the U.S, opposed to any other country, as an object of the study has 
been dictated by the fact that the crash of the U.S. housing market was a significant event which 
influenced not only the U.S. economy but also had an international impact. For instance, on the 
countries engaged in financial trading with the U.S. (Schwartz, 2009, p. 57). In order to present a 
manageable focus on the crisis, this project investigates events and procedures that took place 
during the years leading up to the crash of the U.S. housing market in 2007. Especially the 
processes, the reasons behind them and the different influences that caused the crash. Therefore, 
the focus of this project is primarily on the financial concept of subprime mortgages, and 
governmental deregulations within the housing market. 
  
This questioning leads to the presentation of the following problem formulation: 
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Problem Formulation 
To what extent did the subprime mortgages and changes in regulation impact the rise and 
crash of the U.S. housing market in the years leading up to 2007? 
  
Working questions 
1) What changes in regulation and actions of government agencies were made in that time 
period, and how does this relate to the theories by Friedman and the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis? 
 
2) What is the purpose of subprime mortgages and what role, if any, did they play in the years 
leading up to the crash of the U.S housing market? 
 
3) In relation to the issue of subprime mortgages, how are derivatives relevant when 
investigating the crash of the U.S. housing market? 
We will first introduce the reader to our choice of methods, including the epistemological 
approach. We have chosen to begin the project with our methods chapter because we believe 
that, in this project, it is important to understand how we have chosen to structure it, and what 
kind of material we are going to use. This will be followed by a theory chapter in which four 
theories will be presented. Though two of the theories are written by the same author, we have 
chosen to distinguish between them. After the theory chapter, we will, in our concept and 
definition chapter, explain a variety of concepts in order to create the best possible context for 
the analysis. Next is the data chapter containing our legislative material, leading to the analysis. 
Basing on the legislative data, the previously presented theories and additional data in the form 
of statistics, we will discuss the different underlying aspects and problems in regards to the U.S. 
housing market. The analysis will collect the strands of our working questions, which will be tied 
together in the conclusion as an answer to our problem formulation. Following, we will provide a 
perspective chapter, which will reflect on what we could have done differently, and other issues 
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related to our problem. Every paragraph will end with a small section, which will explain why 
this is relevant to the project.  
The above description of the structure of our project reflects our use of the so-called combined 
model, which allows a concurrent process of using theories and analysis. This strategy will be 
elaborated in the methods chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group nr. 4: Nikolaj Gedionsen, Hildenize Oliveira de Jesus, Katarzyna Tarasiewicz & Nina 
Kattler 
Roskilde University 
SIB, 3rd semester 
 
9 
2) Methods 
In this chapter, our methodological approach will be presented. Firstly, a short introduction will 
be presented, followed by an account of our philosophy of social science approach. Secondly, 
our analytical strategy will shortly be outlined in order to proceed with a presentation of a 
method model which will show how we use both our data and theories we have chosen for this 
project. Lastly, we will consider the delimitations of our choice of methods.  
As 3rd semester students, the analytical framework has to be interdisciplinary between at least 
two of the basic courses we have had so far: Political Science, Sociology, Economics and 
Planning, Space and Resources (PSR). This is decreed by Roskilde University’s own study 
bylaws and arguably this could be viewed as confinement but in our own project group, it was 
only perceived as a helpful guide to our choice of research. We find that the interdisciplinarity 
gives the possibility to reach new and interesting aspects of research. In our project, we aim to 
focus on subjects that fall in under Political Science and Economics, and at a glance that do not 
seem too innovative. We believe that the way this project distinguished itself compared to 
contemporary approaches is our choice of the methodological approach. 
 
The critical realism approach 
In this project, we have chosen to approach the crash of the U.S. housing market of 2007 from a 
critical realism approach. This choice has been made both because its fundamental view on 
causal mechanisms mirror many of the project group's own, and because the traditional 
positivistic approach to economics does not provide the broader scope of the subject. Critical 
realism states that causal mechanisms and the actions that they cause are not always reflected in 
the perceived experience of society and that [...] phenomena are identified and then investigated 
and explanations are proposed and empirically tested (Delanty, 2005, p. 148). 
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We link this to the political science and economic aspects of our project in two ways: firstly, we 
identify what we believe are the major events which partly contributed to the cause of the US 
housing crash of 2007. Secondly, we use the combined model (which will be explained later) to 
propose explanations which in turn will be tested (again, linked to the combined model). 
As mentioned earlier, mainstream economics and its focus on models, numbers and assumptions 
largely consists of a positivist point of view. So when these positivist models fail to capture real 
developments (or real crashes in this case), this is where models and the real world become 
disconnected. By using a critical realism approach our search for causation and explanation will 
focus on the regulatory framework surrounding the U.S. housing crash of 2007. Then we will 
compare the explanation to the empirical data we present and by doing this we will achieve a 
more realistic and tested model of structures and causal powers. In other words, by using both 
the statistical data exclaiming an economic crash and a deeper understanding of the political 
policies leading up to the crash, we will form a better understanding of the events that occurred.  
Why is this relevant to this project? 
This section presented critical realism in its essence and also showed how it is linked to our 
approach to both empirical data and the chosen theories. It also leads up to how and why we are 
able to use both qualitative and quantitative data in our combined model. 
 
Analytical strategy 
Quantitative methods are useful to get an overview of the scope of a problem and provide insight 
into variables which may exist within a field of study. However, the figures rarely speak for 
themselves and therefore the interpretation work is often the biggest challenge in the quantitative 
studies (Harboe, 2010, p. 46). 
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In this project the different statistics leading up to and after the U.S. housing crash of 2007 are 
considered quantitative data and will be used as a measurement to show what impact the 
implemented policies had on the U.S. housing market. We define qualitative methods as [...] 
explorative, i.e. they investigate or explore subjects. […] Qualitative methods are elaborative, 
which means “carefully prepared” (Harboe, 2010, pp. 47-48). 
In this project, we make use of a variety of legal documents, statements and releases from 
government commissions. We consider this to be qualitative data in the sense of framing the 
underlying goals of the political actors. In order to reconcile the different nature of our 
documents, we have interpreted and presented the essence of the various qualitative empirical 
data. We make use of our choice of theory by applying the theories to the events we investigate 
in the project. 
By dividing the data up this way, we aim our analytical strategy to use what can be called a 
combined model, which allows a concurrent process of using theories and analyzing. 
Finally, we have chosen not to have a chapter on statistics, as we deemed it to be more coherent 
if the utilized statistics were in the context where they are used. Thus, the statistics will appear in 
the analysis and not in a chapter by itself. 
Why is this relevant to this project?  
This gives a quick overview of how we understand qualitative and quantitative data and how we 
plan to use it in this project. It also leads up well to the part in which we include the presentation 
of our combined model. 
 
 
Combined model 
An analytical strategy is often divided into two models: the linear and the circular model. The 
linear model, or deductive approach, is often the preferred analytical strategy among researchers 
because of its direct procession (Flick, 2009, pp. 90-95). In this project, this line of inquiry seems 
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to be a logical choice given that a large part of our data is of a quantitative nature. The circular 
model, or inductive approach, starts out with no theoretical background and it will subsequently 
lead to a formulation of a theory in accordance with the gathered data (Flick, 2009. pp. 90-95). 
This model does not fit well with the project’s premise as it is firmly rooted in an all-
encompassing ideological approach and in our case, this would be capitalism. 
By combining these two models a third option emerges, the combined model, where deduction 
and induction are, in a sense, put together. As presented earlier, this model takes from the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. In this project, the quantitative data is used 
as a type of measurement to determine the impact of the different qualitative data. In other 
words, the policies' model on how the world (in this case, the U.S. housing economy) should 
look is measured up against how it actually ended up looking. In this project, such use of theory 
has been made in order to understand the qualitative data. In a sense, it is a theory vs. reality, or 
more precisely, action (and the reason behind) vs. consequence and what it tells us about the big 
picture. 
Put together this way, this model qualifies as a combined model and will lead to more nuanced 
conclusion to the problem formulation presented in the project.  
Why is this relevant to this project? 
This section presented some of the very important issues, which are: our model of approach to 
the problem formulation, the way we view the data and how we plan to use it. 
 
Delimitations 
The U.S. housing crash of 2007 consists of numerous facets and includes countless areas of 
study. Therefore, the choice of focus has been made in order to limit ourselves, and the purpose 
of that is to both fulfill the project requirements and to present a coherent picture of the crash. By 
using a critical realism approach and the combined model together with its components, the 
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project will be able to encompass a number of relevant aspects regarding the crisis of the housing 
market. 
Initially, in order to be considered an important characteristic in this project, we had the 
following criteria: 
- Must have had an economic impact on the housing market of the U.S. in the years leading up to 
2007, preferably no more than 5 years. 
- Must have had some relation to the political actions which were taken in the years leading up to 
2007 and which were connected with the housing market of the U.S.  
- Must have been able to give an overview of the numbers (i.e. amount, size, etc.) connected with 
subprime mortgages in the U.S. leading up to 2007 and a couple of years beyond. 
- Elements that can give an interpretation of some of the intentions behind the political actions 
taken in the U.S. in regards to the housing market and related to it events which took place 
during years leading up to 2007. 
After the preliminary research, we chose to focus on subprime mortgages and associated 
regulations when looking at the U.S. housing crash of 2007. This choice was made in order to 
enable us to take a straightforward look at what we believe to be some of the most important 
characteristics of the crisis. 
Why is this relevant to this project? 
This presents the points we perceive as important in identifying some of the central elements in 
the U.S. housing crash of 2007 and helps to underline what is the focus in this project. 
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3) Theory 
In this chapter, we introduce two contrasting theories made respectively by Milton Friedman, 
who takes a very liberal standpoint, and Hyman Minsky who, in recent years, has made a 
comeback in popularity with his post-Keynesianism and bubble-theory. Additionally, the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis by Eugene Fama will be introduced and explained. These theories 
will be presented in order to create a framework for the analysis and also to provide perspective 
for the entire project. This section will help to understand the instabilities in the market and 
particular factors and processes lying behind the changes occurring in the economy. 
 
Milton Friedman: Capitalism & Freedom (1963) 
Milton Friedman (1912-2006) was a praised American economist and Nobel Prize laureate in 
economics. Friedman was an advocate of economic freedom, including minimal government 
intervention, and he is widely known for his critique of fellow economist John Maynard Keynes 
(Walter, 2008). 
In the 1970’s Milton Friedman was among the economists (especially John F. Muth and Robert 
E. Lucas Jr.) who helped create a shift in economic thinking, leaving Keynesian economics and 
creating the so-called [...] rational expectations revolution (Sargent, 2008). 
 
The role of government 
In his book, Capitalism & Freedom from 1963, Friedman deals with several aspects of society 
wherein the government’s role is debated. He begins by clarifying his main point: [...] that the 
great threat to freedom is the concentration of power (Friedman, 1963, p. 2) and the resulting 
[...] power to coerce - […] be it in the hands of […] a dictator, […] or a momentary majority 
(Friedman, 1963, p. 15). As such, the government, a so-called “momentary majority”, can be a 
threat to freedom as it concentrates power in the hands of politicians (Friedman, 1963, p. 2). 
Therefore, the size and range of government must be limited whilst still ensuring basic functions, 
one of which is [...] to foster competitive markets (Friedman, 1963, p. 2). However, the 
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protection of freedom, Friedman argues, is only one of two reasons for a limited government; the 
other is the argument that government never can [...] duplicate the variety and diversity of 
individual action (Friedman, 1963, p. 4). According to Friedman, no great advances in society 
has come from a centralized government (Friedman, 1963, p. 3) and imposing uniform standards 
in various parts of society (e.g. schooling or sanitation) will without a doubt create an 
improvement locally or perhaps nationally, but by imposing these standards, [...] government 
would replace progress by stagnation (Friedman, 1963, p. 4). 
 
Economic freedom 
After having established the general role of government, Friedman turns to the subject of 
economic freedom where he discusses competitive capitalism and the free market in relation to 
the government. 
Fundamentally, Friedman argues, there are only two possibilities of organizing the economy of a 
country inhabited by millions of individuals. The first is [...] central direction involving the use 
of coercion (Friedman, 1963, p. 13), which is used only by the military and totalitarian states. 
Second is [...] voluntary cooperation of individuals (Friedman, 1963, p. 13). A functioning 
version of this model is a so-called [...] free private enterprise exchange economy (Friedman, 
1963, p.13), which is what is generally known as competitive capitalism. Friedman argues that 
competitive capitalism [...] provides economic freedom directly […] because it separates 
economic power from political power (Friedman, 1963, p. 9) and makes it impossible for [...] the 
one to offset the other (Friedman, 1963, p. 9), thus removing the organization of economic 
activity from the control of political authority (Friedman, 1963, p. 15). However, as Friedman 
mentions, it is entirely possible to have a capitalist economy without having political freedom 
(Friedman, 1963, p. 9). 
In relation to the free market, Friedman believes that the government has certain responsibilities, 
while still maintaining its limited range. Those responsibilities contain what [...] the market 
cannot do for itself, namely, to determine, arbitrate, and enforce the rules of the game 
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(Friedman, 1963, p. 27). Thus, Friedman declares the limits to the free market and the 
importance of the government in the economic sector. 
 
Government expansion and the Federal Reserve 
What we urgently need, for both economic stability and growth, is a reduction of government 
intervention not an increase (Friedman, 1963, p. 38). 
In the time of writing, Friedman saw an expansion of [...] the extend of government intervention 
in economic affairs (Friedman, 1963, p. 37) which he did not enjoy. The expansion of 
government was executed due to the apparent need of full employment and economic growth, 
consequently calling the [...] private free-enterprise economy (Friedman, 1963, p. 37) unstable 
and arguing that [...] left to itself, [the private free-enterprise economy] will produce recurrent 
cycles of boom and busts (Friedman, 1963, p. 37). With this conviction, the U.S. government in 
1913 [...] established a separate official body charged with explicit responsibility for monetary 
conditions (Friedman, 1963, p. 44), also known as the Federal Reserve System. Besides the 
failures of the Federal Reserve System in the time period of 1929 to 1933, which we will not go 
further into in this project, Friedman expresses a general concern with the establishment of 
institutions. Therefore, enabling [...] government to exercise responsibility for money while at the 
same time attempting to [...] limit the power thereby given to government and prevent this power 
from being used in ways that will tend to weaken rather than strengthen a free society 
(Friedman, 1963, p. 39). 
 
Central banking 
In connection to central banking, Friedman believed that central banks should be abolished due 
to their negative influence on markets: according to his belief, they cause market distortions and 
thereby lead to financial instabilities within economy. Although, during crises, central banking is 
believed to help stabilize the financial system with particular emphasis on the credit market, 
when there is a stable situation in a period between crises […] the presence of a central bank 
promotes more risky lending practices and therefore greater levels of debt (Cooper, 2008, p. 59).  
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During the TV interview in which he gave a speech about central banking, Milton Friedman 
presented his view on the causes of financial instabilities. He argued that in general everyone 
looks for the right man (Friedman, Central Banking, 0:09), meaning that it is believed that a 
person governing a particular system is responsible for its functioning and performance and that 
system which depends on the right man is a bad system (Friedman, Central Banking, 0:15), 
giving as an example the Federal Reserve. Later in his speech, Friedman argues that if the system 
happens to fail or destabilize it means that unlike to what is believed, it’s the system that’s wrong 
(Friedman, Central Banking, 0:45) and that its functioning should not depend on a particular 
person pushing the buttons at the right time (Friedman, Central Banking, 0:55). The prosperity of 
those systems might not create the perfect stability but will, according to Friedman, produce far 
higher degree of stability, a far greater level of freedom and far greater level of prosperity 
(Friedman, Central Banking, 1:13). The focus should then be on the organization, structure and 
entire framework of the system, not only on a particular right man. 
 
Why is this relevant to the project? 
In his book “Capitalism & Freedom” Milton Friedman advocates deregulation of government, 
similar to one that happened in the years up to the crash of the housing market in the U.S. 
Furthermore, his view on economic freedom and the related role of government is reflected in 
much of the actions within the legislative changes of the housing market. Friedman’s view on the 
role of central banking in the market can be helpful in explaining how the system experiences 
financial instabilities. 
 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
In 1970, Eugene Fama published the paper Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work in the academic journal The Journal of Finance. In this paper, Fama presented 
his theory of the Efficient Market Model, or as it is commonly known as, the ‘Efficient Market 
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Hypothesis’, which […] is concerned with whether prices at any point in time "fully reflect" 
available information (Fama, 1970, p. 413). 
In the paper, Fama tests whether or not his theory on efficient capital markets is accurate and 
concludes that […] the evidence in support of the efficient markets model is extensive, and 
(somewhat uniquely in economics) contradictory evidence is sparse (Fama, 1970, p. 416). He 
only finds two deviations from the market efficiency: corporate insiders and specialists. These 
two groups are the only […] whose monopolistic access to information has been documented 
(Fama, 1970, p. 415). 
Put in other words, the Efficient Market Hypothesis presumes that […] asset prices are always 
and everywhere at the correct price (Cooper, 2008, p. 9). As such, the […] markets move 
naturally only towards equilibrium (Cooper, 2008, p. 13), until it is disrupted by an external 
event. Advocates of the Efficient Market Hypothesis see government intervention as disruptive 
external events, as […] any interference with market forces can at best achieve nothing (Cooper, 
2008, p. 5). 
 
Fama and Friedman were throughout their academic careers associated with the Chicago School 
of Economics, which has been accused of […] providing a seeming intellectual foundation for 
the idea that markets are self-adjusting and the best role for government is to do nothing 
(Davies, 2010, p. 180) by Nobel Prize laureate in economics Joseph Stigliz. This is in response to 
the so-called Lassez-Faire school of thought, which both Fama and Friedman are known 
supporters of. The Lassez-Faire school of thought finds that the optimal condition for the free 
market, is […] allowing markets to operate with complete freedom, unhindered by any form of 
management, regulation or other government interference (Cooper, 2008, p. 5, footnote 2). 
Thus, the concept of a central bank is undesirable and a threat to the economy. 
 
Why is this relevant to this project? 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis is the very foundation of the modern day financial system. 
Advocating self-optimization and deregulation, it is also coherent with the Lassez-Faire school 
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of thought, which promotes the absolute freedom of the market. Particularly after, but also before 
the crash, the Efficient Market Hypothesis has been criticized for being faulty. 
 
Hyman Minsky: Can “it” happen again? Essays on Instability and 
Finance (1984) 
Hyman Minsky (1919-1996) was an American economist and the creator of the Financial 
Instability Hypothesis. Minsky is known for his research on financial crises, especially the 
identification of the processes leading up to such crises (Wray, 2011.). 
In his work, Minsky focused inter alia on leverage – debt growth relative to assets or income 
which occurred during the periods of financial stability when the risk of borrowers not being able 
to repay their loans was not of a big interest. The increase in leverage, according to Minsky, 
leads to economic instability followed by the financial crisis (Krugman, 2012, p. 27). It relates to 
phenomenon coined by an economist Paul McCulley called ‘Minsky moment’, also known as 
‘Wile E. Coyote moment’, which is […] the point in the cycle when investors experience cash 
flow problems and begin to sell down, leading to a sudden collapse in market prices (Davies, 
2010, p. 28). As Minsky himself puts it, it is the moment when […] units with cash flow 
shortfalls will be forced to try to make position by selling out position. This is likely to lead to a 
collapse of asset values (Minsky, 1992, p. 8). Banks that will to lend big amounts of money, also 
to people with so-called bad credit history, have no consideration for a possible risk of borrowers 
nor being able to repay their loans. That is because according to the bankers, even if borrowers 
lose their jobs, rising house prices will make them sell their properties and thereby pay off the 
loan. A situation of an individual does not have a direct influence on the economy and cannot be 
a threat of a growing debt: [...] As long as nothing really bad happens to the economy, lending 
doesn’t seem very risky (Krugman, 2012, p. 28). 
In Minsky’s work, it can also be found that the history of the market indicates that financial 
crises which occur at times are not completely incidental but rather systematic, as incidents 
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which take place during the financial instability are regularly recurring phenomena (Minsky, 
1984, p. 63). It is strongly connected with collective tranquility, which occurs when things go 
right. As noted above, high expectations towards the future profits coming from the promising 
forecasts favor, change in decision-making connected with credit market, but also cause the 
spreading feeling of security, which may prove destructive. When facing the promise of happy, 
successful and profitable future, one is willing to take risky steps in order to ensure own access 
to expected benefits. In this way, taking loans, which might not be repaid due to unstable 
financial situation of the borrower or economic changes on the market, seems to be reasonable 
and safe when economy is characterized by stability and efficiency and there is a great 
probability of profit.  
As also mentioned in the beginning of this section, Hyman Minsky, who is considered a post-
Keynesian, mainly focused on the recurring instabilities in the market in relation to implications 
of the financial factors. His focus was, among many issues, put on the phenomenon of the 
bubbles appearing in various economic situations. He established seven stages of economic 
bubbles, which are: disturbance, expansion, euphoria, overtrading, market reversal, financial 
crisis and revulsion. The description and interpretation of these can be found in Nathan Martin’s 
work called “Hyman Minsky’s Seven Bubble Stages” (2010), while we have included their short 
presentation in the project. 
 
Stage 1 (Disturbance) – every bubble which can potentially lead to financial crisis, starts with 
an event which changes some sector of economy in a way that it starts to be perceived 
differently. It can be new innovative technology, change in federal funds rate or shift in policies - 
regulations and laws. No matter what the reason is, it has the potential to forever change the 
course of the economic events. 
 
Stage 2 (Expansion) – following the disturbance a real boom in prices occur. They start to 
increase slowly, but the more people get interested and join the market, the faster the prices 
grow. The whole process finds its coverage in media which spread the news about ‘once in a 
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lifetime’ opportunity attracting more and more attention. “Good news” are being spread and the 
popularity of house buying spreads at a rapid pace. 
 
Stage 3 (Euphoria) – during this phase when prices keep on growing, cheap credits become 
widely available for almost everyone regardless of financial situation or status, and thereby there 
are many risky investments being done. Easily accessible loans fuel the bubble, which does not 
grow just due to increasing prices of the houses. Increasing prices are not enough anymore. The 
rising bubble needs outsiders and easy loans are the means of attracting them to the bubble. 
Minsky states: [...] The fundamental instability of capitalism is upward. After functioning well 
for a time a capitalist economy develops a tendency to explode, to become “euphoric”. This is so 
because an initial condition is a world with uncertainty (Minsky, 1984, p. 284). During 
promising times, people become unreasonably optimistic about the better and brighter future, 
which they start to have high expectations about. The start putting aside the thoughts and doubts 
of eventual risks associated with borrowing huge amounts of money. Thanks to these participants 
who would not be there if they were not allowed to get cheap, easy loans, bubbles do not regress 
but grow in power and size. It is the time of the greedy, the desperate and the foolish. 
 
Stage 4 (Over-trading) – following the increasing prices and connected with it increasing 
number of easy, cheap credits, market starts to speed up and overtrade. As easy profits are on the 
agenda, more and more inexperienced and desperate participants enter the market, and slowly 
prices get out of control. 
 
Stage 5 (Market Reversal) – at this point some voices raise an alarm about bubble growing too 
fast and indicate that something should be done in order to prevent the future breakdown of the 
market.  
However, as Minsky states, these voices are being ignored by those who justify increasing prices 
with fundamental changes in the economy. The new motto says: new prices are part of the world 
now and this is how the world operates. These persons who participate, although they should not, 
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are the ones who will suffer the most, due to their unstable financial situation, unless they 
withdraw before the bubble bursts. However, being tempted by easy and quick profit makes them 
last for hazardous actions. 
 
Stage 6 (Financial Crisis) – increasing prices reach the point where they have to change the 
course in order to reflect demand and supply in the market. They start to decrease as fast as they 
had increased as at this point supply overwhelms demand and investors try to sell their holdings 
at any price. This is what Minsky describes as the panic stage, during which participants who 
have now noticed and realized that the bubble has gone too far, want to escape from the market 
with the lowest possible loss.  
 
Stage 7 (Revulsion) – because losses are unavoidable, participants who had blindly entered the 
market drawing from easy credit source to purchase properties they could not really afford, 
replace their previous excitement and expectations with panic and revulsion. There is nobody in 
the market to buy and enormous losses start to accumulate. This is the time of a fast deepening of 
the debt (Martin N., 2010). 
 
Why is this relevant to the project? 
The understanding of the entire process during which bubbles come into being and rise 
throughout the time, provided and supported by Hyman Minsky can help researchers in 
perceiving and analyzing the phenomena that occurred within the history of the U.S. housing 
market. Since a small change in policies can become a flashpoint for the long process of market 
instability, being aware of the variables and factors influencing that process seems to be 
indispensable for the study of the crash of the housing market and instability. 
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The Financial Instability Hypothesis     
In 1992, Hyman Minsky published the working paper The Financial Instability Hypothesis as 
part of the textbook Handbook of Radical Political Economy from 1993, edited by P. Arestis and 
M. Sawyer. In it, Minsky presents his financial instability hypothesis as an opposition to the 
efficient market hypothesis created in 1970 by Fama. Minsky’s critique of the builds on his 
belief that […] the economy does not always conform to the classic precepts, which assumes that 
the market […] is constantly an equilibrium seeking and sustaining system (Minsky, 1992, p. 1). 
Financial Instability Hypothesis is the description of how certain mechanisms of the economy 
influence the generating of financial crises, and provide an explanation of the origins of changes 
in the market and economy.  
As Minsky points out himself, […] the financial instability hypothesis is an interpretation of the 
substance of Keynes's "General Theory" (Minsky, 1992, p. 1). It has two theorems. The first 
theorem says that every economy has different “financing regimes” among which some lead to 
financial stability while others cause its instability. The second theorem states that over time 
economy tends to move from stability to instability by the transition in financial relations 
(Minsky, 1992, p. 8). Put differently, Minsky’s second theorem claims that […] financial 
markets are not self-optimizing, or stable (Cooper, 2008, p. 13), and that it is the market itself, 
which changes the outcome. Minsky defines the current economic system as capitalistic […] 
with expensive capital assets and a complex, sophisticated financial system (Misky, 1992, p. 2). 
According to Minsky’s interpretation of the cash-flow in the capitalistic world, capitalists do not 
spend money – they invest it. It means that in a capitalist economy the amount of the future gross 
profits is largely defined by the total of the future investment: [...] The capital development of a 
capitalist economy is accompanied by exchanges of present money for future money (Minsky, 
1992, p. 2). The present money ensures the access to resources used for investments and future 
money is the profit expected to occur. These future profits are, according to Michał Kalecki and 
Jerome Levy, a significant factor, which has an impact on the variable nature of the economy. 
They are expected to be high enough to create big cash-flows capable of paying off the debt and 
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it establishes the condition of the debt market and depends upon the future investments. Futures 
profits have a positive influence on decision-making regarding new investments and financing 
them with credit money (Minsky, 1984, p. 65).  
According to Minsky, rise in leverage – [...] buildup of debt relative to assets and income 
(Krugman, 2008, p. 26) – builds the ground for economic instability and what leads to increasing 
leverage is long periods of stability during which people become complacent about the eventual 
risk. Banks’ politics, which create debts through lending money to everyone, regardless of their 
status or financial condition, play a significant role in the shift in system’s behavior. According 
to the financial instability hypothesis, banking is thus viewed as a profit-making activity. 
 
Why is this relevant to the project? 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis presents the idea that the financial system is currently vastly 
complex and is inevitably becoming unstable. Therefore, it stands in sharp contrast with the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis and the common understanding of the financial system at the time 
before the crash of the U.S. housing market in 2007. 
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4) Concepts and definition 
In this chapter, concepts, i.e. government agencies, financial terms and the like, will be defined 
and explained. First, is the Federal Reserve, then the federal funds rate, subprime mortgages, net 
capital rule, derivatives and the final, and sixth, is Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
 
What is the Federal Reserve System? 
The Federal Reserve System is the central bank of the U.S. It was created in 1913 in the Federal 
Reserve Act, as a separate official body with the purpose of [maintaining] long run growth of the 
monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase 
production (FED2). In the Federal Reserve Act, the three main objectives are stated as [...] 
maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates (FED4).  
The Federal Reserve System is administered by the Board of Governors, consisting of seven 
governors, all appointed by the president of the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, 
which is the legislative chamber of the U.S. Congress. To ensure stability, the appointed 
governors serve 14-year terms, apart from the chairman and vice-chairman who only serve four-
year terms. 
The responsibilities of the Board of Governors are, among other things, [...] to guide monetary 
policy actions, to analyze domestic […] and financial conditions, and to lead committees that 
study current issues, such as consumer banking laws […] (FED1). 
The Federal Reserve System is also capable of lending money to various depository institutions 
[...] to address temporary problems they may have in obtaining funding (FED3), but such loans 
are expensive, as the Federal Reserve should be viewed the last resort. 
Regarding the U.S. housing market, and the concluding crash, the Federal Reserve has been 
defined as an institution who uses policies to aggressively […] prevent or reverse credit 
contraction or asset price deflation, but is not used to prevent credit expansion or asset inflation 
(Cooper, 2008, p. 24). As Cooper argues, this is because of a general attitude of the Federal 
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Reserve, towards asset inflation, that they […] cannot be identified until after they burst, and it’s 
only then that the central banks can and should take action (Cooper, 2008, p. 24). 
 
What is the federal funds rate? 
The federal funds rate is […] the central interest rate in the U.S. financial market (FRED). It is 
the interest rate, which banks, more specifically depository institutions, can trade money 
borrowed from the Federal Reserve, also known as Federal Funds, with each other overnight 
(FRED). The federal funds rate influences other interest rates, e.g. both the prime rate, for the 
highest rated customers, and […]indirectly influences longer- term interest rates such as 
mortgages, loans, and savings, all of which are very important to consumer wealth and 
confidence (FRED). Put differently, the federal funds rate can be used by the Federal Reserve to 
adjust the interest rate the depository institutions charge for their loans. 
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) sets the federal funds target rate. If the FOMC 
[…] believes the economy is growing too fast and inflation pressures (FRED), the committee has 
the authority to […] set a higher federal funds rate […] to temper economic activity (FRED). In 
the opposing situation, […] the FOMC may set a lower federal funds rate target to spur greater 
economic activity (FRED). 
The chart below says the effective federal funds rate, because the rate set by the FOMC, the 
federal funds target rate, does not reflect reality but is more of a goal. When the FOMC 
determines the federal funds target rate, the target rate influences the effective rate […] through 
open market operations or by buying and selling of government bonds (government debt) 
(FRED). 
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Figure 1. A chart of the effective federal funds fate. Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) . 
 
As visible from the chart of the effective federal funds rate, there are several spikes in the graph. 
What is relevant to this project is that from May 2000 to June 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered 
the Federal Funds Rate from 6.50% to 1.00%. This period of low short-term interest rate has 
been criticized for creating […] very loose credit conditions (Davies, 2010, p. 21), thus 
supplementing the growth in housing prices in the U.S. The chairman of the Federal Reserve at 
the time, Alan Greenspan, rejected                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
this critique by stating that […] the global home price bubble of the last decade was a 
consequence of lower interest rates, but it was long-term interest rates that galvanized home 
asset prices, not the overnight rates of central banks (Greenspan, 2010, p. 235). 
 
What is a subprime mortgage? 
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Before explaining a subprime mortgage loan, it is important to understand what a mortgage loan 
is. A mortgage loan is when either an individual or a business makes a real estate purchase, e.g. a 
house, but instead of paying the entire amount, the borrower repays the loan, plus interest, until 
the whole sum has been paid. If the borrower stop paying the mortgage, the bank can foreclose, 
meaning that the bank takes possession of the house and can evict the home’s residents. 
Afterwards, the bank can sell the house, and as such, clear the remaining mortgage debt 
(Kimball, 2012). A subprime mortgage loan is a mortgage with [...] elevated risk [which] may 
stem from the credit history of the borrower, the lack of a large down payment, or a monthly 
payment that is large relative to the borrower’s income (Foote, 2011). As such, a subprime 
mortgage loan contains a larger risk for the lending institution, which they compensate by a 
higher interest rate. 
The amount and prevalence of subprime lending developed rapidly during years before the crash 
of the U.S. housing market of 2007 and are considered to play a vital role in the crash. 
 
What is the net capital rule?                                                                                                        
Net capital rule, also known as “Rule 15c3-1”, is a rule created by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1975, and establishes net capital standards for brokers and 
dealers. The purpose of net capital rule is, [...] to ensure that registered broker-dealers maintain 
at all times sufficient liquid assets (SEC3), in order to both, be able to return the liability claims 
of their customers if such is demanded, and be able [...] to provide a cushion of liquid assets in 
excess of liabilities to cover potential market, credit, and other risks if they should be required to 
liquidate (SEC3). As such, the net capital rule […] enhances investor/customer & confidence in 
the financial integrity of broker-dealers and the securities market (SEC3). 
 
What is a derivative? 
A derivative is a financial instrument, or contract, between two parties where the [...] payoffs are 
derived from the value of something else, generally called the underlying (Stulz, 2004, p. 3). 
There are five kinds of derivatives: Futures, Forwards, Options, Swaps and Exotics. 
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1) Futures. A futures is a contract where two parties agree [...] to buy or sell a certain asset at a 
future date and at an agreed price (Alessandrini, 2011, p. 443). An example of this would be if 
A has $100 and agrees to sell it to B in a month, at a price concurrent with the current exchange 
rate. If the exchange rate goes up, A loses money as the $100 now are worth more than a month 
ago. If the exchange rate goes down, A gains money as the $100 now are worth less than a 
month ago. 
2) Forwards. A forward contract is similar to a future contract, in that they both contain an 
agreement to buy or sell an asset at an agreed time to an agreed price. The difference is that 
futures are traded in exchanges, and are thus under regulation and made from standardized 
contracts, whereas forwards are created privately, as so-called “Over-The-Counter” or OTC. As 
such, forwards do not possess the same kind of security from defaults as futures. 
3) Options. Options: […] are contracts which confer the right to buy or sell a particular asset at 
a certain date and at a certain price (Alessandrini, 2011, p. 443). An example of an option is if 
A wishes to buy the house B has for sale. A does not have the money to buy the house 
immediately, so the two parties make a deal, that A gets the option to buy the house in 3 months 
for the agreed amount. A pays B e.g. $3000 for the option. A is not obligated to buy the house, 
but B is obligated to sell it. What could happen next is that A discovers defects concerning the 
house, so that A no longer wishes to buy the house. In the end, A does not have to buy the flawed 
house, but he still payed $3000 for that option. Another outcome is unforeseen values regarding 
the property is discovered, e.g. an oil deposit, thus increasing the value of the estate, which B is 
still obliged to sell to A at the agreed price. 
4) Swaps. A swap contract is an agreement where A, who has a floating interest-rate on a loan 
and wishes to have a fixed interest rate, agrees […] to make payments to a counterparty, say a 
bank, equal to a fixed interest rate applied to [the amount A initially borrowed]. In exchange, the 
bank would pay [A] a floating rate applied to [the amount A initially borrowed]. With this 
interest rate swap, you would use the floating-rate payments received from the bank to make 
[the] mortgage payments (Stulz, 2004, p. 6). As such, there is no sale or exchange of asset. A 
variant of the swap derivative is the credit default swaps, which will be explained later on. 
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5) Exotics. Exotic derivatives are not fabricated by combinations of futures or options. Instead, 
the payoff of exotics is a complicated function of one or many underlyings (Stulz, 2004, p. 7). As 
such, exotic derivatives are much more complex and difficult to account for. 
 
In general, derivatives [...] provide firms and governments with the means to hedge (i.e. protect) 
themselves against the risks of price fluctuations (Alessandrini, 2011, p. 441). 
Historically, the trading of swaps did not begin until the 1970’s, where up until then [...] the 
trading of derivatives took the form mostly of option, forward, and future contracts (Stulz, 2004, 
p. 10). As of April 2001, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) estimated […] an average 
daily trading volume of $489 billion for interest rate derivatives (Stulz, 2004, p. 14), and that as 
of 2004, […] interest rate swaps represent 56 percent of the market. (Stulz, 2004, p. 11).  
 
What are Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae?                                                                                                      
The Federal National Mortgage Association, or as it is better known, Fannie Mae, was created in 
1938 by then President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the U.S. Congress. Its purpose was to 
purchase mortgages from lenders and by doing so free up capital that could go to other borrowers 
and that was […] including substantial efforts at assisting the housing sector through the 
mortgage insurance […] (DIC). 
 
Then in 1968, Fannie Mae [...] became a publicly traded company, but it retained the array of 
special features that [made it] a true GSE [Government-Sanctioned Enterprise] (DIC). In order 
to avoid a monopoly The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or Freddie Mac, was 
created which went public in 1989 (DIC).                                                                                                                            
 
In 1992, President George H.W. Bush required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to fulfill the annual 
[…] affordable housing goals (LAW2) of the HUD (Department of Housing and Urban 
Development). Because of that, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were now obligated […] to 
facilitate the financing of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families [...] while 
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maintaining a strong financial condition and a reasonable economic return (LAW1). 
 
As such, right before the millennium, under pressure from the Clinton administration, […] 
Fannie Mae relaxed credit standards and became an aggressive buyer of subprime loans 
(Williams, 2010, p. 125). Around 2003 the two GSE's dominated the (subprime) mortgage 
market and their influence was so all-encompassing that the U.S. Treasury was forced to offer 
assurance against collapse because of the inherited understanding that the enterprises were too 
large to be allowed to fail (DIC). Additionally, at the time, the enterprises’ [...] details of the 
derivatives activities were not public information (DIC). 
As the new millennium went on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac […] facilitated the rapid 
expansion of the subprime market in the early years of the century by being prepared to buy up 
the resulting mortgages on a massive scale. […] Those purchases led to the very costly collapse 
of the two GSEs (Davies, 2010, p. 31). 
It was not until after the crash of the U.S. housing market in 2007 that the costly affair was clear 
and in 2010 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were delisted from the New York Stock Exchange. 
 
Why is this relevant to this project? 
With this chapter, we create better context for the analysis and general understanding for the 
reader. By presenting the concepts this way, we also stay true to our methodological approach in 
the way that some of these definitions also act as empirical data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group nr. 4: Nikolaj Gedionsen, Hildenize Oliveira de Jesus, Katarzyna Tarasiewicz & Nina 
Kattler 
Roskilde University 
SIB, 3rd semester 
 
32 
5) Data  
Legislation 
 
1933: The Glass-Steagall Act 
The Glass-Steagall Act was a part of the Banking Act of 1933, and is named after its main 
creators, senator Carter Glass and representative Henry B. Steagall, both from the Democratic 
Party. Glass-Steagall was passed in the aftermath of the Great Depression, and it separated 
commercial and investment banks. The following four sections capture the essence of Glass-
Steagall: 
Section 16: [...] The business of dealing in investment securities by the association shall be 
limited to purchasing and selling such securities without recourse, solely upon the order, and for 
the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account (Banking Act of 1933, p. 25). To 
sum up, investment banks are only allowed to transact business on the behalf of their customers, 
and not for their own benefit. 
Section 20: [...] no member bank shall be affiliated in any manner [...] with any corporation, 
association, business trust, or other similar organization engaged principally in the issue, 
flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate 
participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other securities (Banking Act of 1933, p. 30). 
To sum up, a commercial bank is not allowed to indulge in the works of investment banks. 
Section 21: [...] it shall be unlawful (1) for any person, firm, corporation, association, business 
trust, or other similar organisation, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or 
distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, 
debentures, notes or other securities, to engage at the same time to any extend whatever in the 
business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook, 
certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor (Banking Act of 
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1933, p. 30). To sum up, in correlation with section 20, investment banks are not allowed to 
indulge in the business of commercial banks. 
Section 32: [...] no officer or director of any member bank shall be an officer, director or 
manager of any corporation, partnership, or unincorporated association engaged primarily in 
the business of purchasing, selling or negotiating securities (Banking Act of 1933, p. 36). To 
sum up, this section makes it illegal for employees of commercial banks to work for investment 
banks. 
 
Why is this relevant to this project? 
The Glass-Steagall Act is regarded as basis of the regulated financial system in the U.S, 
originating from the Great Depression. Since it banned investment banks and commercial banks 
from merging, it slowly was deregulated, and finally suspended completely in 1999 by the 
Gramm-Leach Bliley Act. As such, it is a relevant part of the legislative process of the U.S. 
housing market and for the U.S. financial market in general. 
 
1977: The Community Reinvestment Act 
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 is title VIII of the Housing and Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977 which was signed into law by President Carter. The CRA has the 
objective […] to encourage [financial] institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local 
communities (CRA, 1977, section 802b). As such, it is directed towards making it more 
accessible for low- and moderate-income households to be entitled to a loan. The reasons behind 
the creation of the CRA was to limit the mortgage-lending discrimination executed by the 
lending-institutions (Davies, 2010, p. 31). This was also the conclusion of a Federal Reserve 
study from 1993 which  
[...] Unintentional discrimination may be observed when a lender’s underwriting policies contain 
arbitrary or outdated criteria that effectively disqualify many urban or lower-income minority 
applicants (B.FED). 
The CRA [...] require the board of directors of each institution to adopt, and at least annually 
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review, a CRA statement (B.FED) and is overseen by the Federal Reserve, who made sure that 
even the larger financial institution created later due to the passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act was under the compliance of the CRA (Williams, 2010, p. 94). 
 
Why is this relevant to this project? 
Though it is not the sole reason for the loose credit regulation, leading to a rapid expansion of 
subprime mortgages, the Community Reinvestment Act is relevant to the project as it is a part of 
the process of making loans more accessible, even for the less financially capable households. 
 
1994: Homeownership and Equity Protection Act 
The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) is part of the Riegle Community 
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, which was signed into law by President 
Clinton. HOEPA addresses a specific type of mortgage, called “high-cost mortgages”, or 
“HOEPA loans”. These HOEPA loans had specific qualifications, which were deemed the most 
abusive and in need of regulation. As the HOEPA loans were already expensive in regards to 
interest rate, HOEPA bans certain terms, as they were estimated to […] create an unreasonable 
risk of foreclosure (Keyfetz, 2005, p. 175). 
An example of this, is prepaid payments. HOEPA bans […] terms under which more than 2 
periodic payments required under the loan are consolidated and paid in advance from the loan 
proceeds provided to the consumer (HOEPA, section 129.2g). Other terms are e.g. prepayment 
penalties (HOEPA, section 129cA) and extending credit without regard to payment ability of the 
consumer (HOEPA, section 129g). 
Furthermore, HOEPA deemed it illegal for lenders to make use of […] any method of computing 
a refund of unearned scheduled interest is a prepayment penalty (HOEPA, section 129ca). 
Lastly, the lender is required to include a specific disclosure, which acts as a warning to the 
borrower. It declares that if the borrower obtains the loan in question, the lender will be able to 
foreclose the estate, if the borrower does […] not meet [the] obligations under the loan (HOEPA, 
section 129a1B). 
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The Federal Reserve has been criticized for not utilizing HOEPA to satisfactory. Sheila Bair, the 
Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation*, especially criticized the Federal Reserve 
for not issuing a [...] more extensive regulation using its HOEPA authority to restrict unfair, 
deceptive or abusive practices in the mortgage market (Bair, 2010). 
*Footnote: an independent government agency in charge of providing deposit insurance and the 
monitoring of deposit insurance funds (FDIC),  
 
Why is this relevant to this project?                                                                                                                                                         
The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act produced a range of requirements for high-cost 
and thus high-risk mortgages. It was meant as a tool for the Federal Reserve to intervene and 
regulate when it deemed it necessary.  
 
1998: CFTC release on Over-The-Counter Derivatives                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
In 1998, the Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC) issued a release calling attention 
to the lack of regulatory authority from the CFTC regarding Over-The-Counter derivatives. The 
release was directed towards the U.S Congress and president Clinton, and in it, the CFTC 
enumerates its lack of authority regarding the growing OTC sector. The largely growing OTC 
market, the release states, […] has been accompanied by an increase in the number and size of 
losses even among large and sophisticated users (CFTC, 1998, under “III. Issues for comment”). 
Furthermore, the release proposes more clarified definitions and protections regarding swaps and 
hybrid instruments (CFTC, 1998, under “2. Eligible Participants”). It deems it appropriate […] to 
consider whether any modifications to the scope or the terms and conditions of the swap and 
hybrid instrument exemptions are needed to enhance the fairness, financial integrity, and 
efficiency of this market (CFTC, 1998, under “III. Issues for comment”). 
More specifically, the CFTS accentuates several complications regarding its authority towards 
Over-The-Counter derivatives. Some of which are regarding capital and recordkeeping. 
Regarding capital requirements, the CFTS […] currently imposes no capital requirements on 
participants in the OTC derivatives markets (CFTC, 1998, under “6. Capital”). As such, there is 
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no assurance regarding the […] firm's ability to perform its obligations to its customers and to its 
counterparties and for controlling systemic risk (CFTC, 1998, under “6. Capital”). 
The same goes with recordkeeping: […] The Commission has not required any recordkeeping 
requirements for OTC derivatives dealers or other OTC market participants (CFTC, 1998, under 
“9. Recordkeeping”). 
 
Why is this relevant to this project? 
This release by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission displays how concerns about the 
non-existing regulation of derivatives were present in the years leading up to the crash of the 
U.S. housing market. 
 
1999: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
Also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was 
signed into law by former U.S. president Bill Clinton on November 12 1999. The law repealed 
section 20 of the Banking Act of 1933, also known as the Glass-Steagall Act, thus [authorizing] 
the establishment of financial holding companies (Hester, 2008), which had the possibility to 
engage in [...] commercial banking, insurance, securities underwriting, merchant banking, and 
complementary financial undertakings (Hester, 2008). This was done in order [...] to reduce [...] 
the legal barriers preventing affiliation among depository institutions, securities firms, insurance 
companies, and other financial service providers (Financial Services Act of 1999, pp. 2-3), thus 
enhancing the [...] competition in the financial services industry (Financial Services Act of 1999, 
p. 2). This new authorization were to be regulated by the Board of Governors in the Federal 
Reserve. 
 
Why is this relevant to this project? 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act abolished what was left of the Glass-Steagall Act, thus making it 
possible for banks to trade in mortgages and derivative products, and is therefore a vital part of 
the legislation related to the housing market. 
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2000: The Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
In 2000, together with the SEC, President Clinton signed the Commodity Futures Modernization 
Act (CFMA) into law. In the CFMA, it says that […] the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission shall not exercise regulatory authority with respect to, a banking product if the 
product is a hybrid instrument (CFMA, 2000, section 405a) or in regards to […] a covered swap 
agreement offered, entered into, or provided by a bank (CFMA, 2000, section 407). As such, the 
CFMA banned the CFTC from regulating swaps and the so-called hybrid instruments, which are 
banking products with several payments concerning various commodities (CFMA, 2000, section 
402c). This was done by defining hybrid instruments not as […] a contract of sale of a 
commodity for future delivery (or option on such a contract) subject to the Commodity Exchange 
Act (CFMA, 2000, section 405b4). 
 
Why is this relevant to this project? 
Seen together with the 1998 release by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act is a clear response to the initiatives proposed by the 
CFTC. The CFMA banned the CFTC from taking action against the OTC derivatives, and is thus 
a vital part of legislation in the context of the crash of the U.S. housing market. 
 
2003: American Dream Downpayment Initiative 
The American Dream Downpayment Initiative (ADDI) was proposed by former U.S. president 
George W. Bush, and signed into law on December 16 2003. ADDI was an annual $200 million 
downpayment assistance program, designed to […] assist low-income first-time home buyers by 
helping […] with the biggest hurdle to homeownership: down-payment and closing costs (HUD). 
 
Why is this relevant to this project? 
The American Dream Downpayment Initiative expresses how the government through its 
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legislative branches made taking a loan more accessible, even if the borrower had a bad credit 
history. 
 
2004: “Voluntary regulation” and suspension of net capital rule                                               
On April 28 2004 there was a meeting in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) – 
where item three on the agenda is noteworthy. Item three, or as the SEC called it; ”Alternative 
Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that are Part of Consolidated Supervised Facilities 
and Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies”, deals with an exception to the net capital 
rule. This exception allowed the five largest investment banks, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, 
Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and Morgan Stanley, to use the capital held in reserve for 
investments, and as such surpass the limit to the amount of debt they could take on. Thus, 
making it possible for the firms to lever up 10, 20, and even 30 to 1; meaning that e.g. for every 
1$ they have, they owe 30$.  
These investment banks were to be put under voluntary regulation, the so-called Consolidated 
Supervised Entities program, where they were [...] allowed to compute certain market and credit 
risk capital charges using internal mathematical models (SEC1), essentially letting the firms use 
their own models to determine the riskiness of the investments. 
This program was canceled in 2008 by the chairman of SEC, Christopher Cox, who then, with 
the power of hindsight, could declare that the program [...] did not work [and that it is vital to] 
ensure there are no similar major gaps in our regulatory framework (SEC2). 
Why is this relevant to this project? 
The suspension of the net capital rule meant that the five firms were allowed to make more risky 
investments and removing a vital security buffer in the process. As such, we find this exception 
of regulation to be part of the regulatory looseness in the years leading up to the crash of the U.S. 
housing market. 
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6) Analysis  
In this chapter the three working questions presented in the introduction will be examined and 
discussed. The first is the working question regarding changes in regulation, actions of 
government agencies and how this relates to the previously presented theories by Friedman and 
Fama’s Efficient Market Hypothesis. The second deals with the purpose of subprime mortgages 
in the context of the crash of the U.S. housing market. The third and final, working question 
examines the role of derivatives in the financial market, and how derivatives correlates with 
subprime mortgages. These three working questions will, in the conclusion, be tied together in 
order to answer our problem formulation. 
 
Working questions 
1) What changes in regulation and actions of government agencies were made in 
that time period, and how does this relate to the theories by Friedman and the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis? 
 
In this section, an answer to the first working question will be presented. Firstly, a small list will 
illustrate the changes made in policies regarding the housing market in the years leading up to 
2007 and what consequences they had. Secondly, a review of the changes made in some of the 
prominent government agencies and the general relation to Friedman’s theories and the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis will be presented. Thirdly, keeping Minsky’s theory on Financial Instability 
in mind, a hindsight look on the U.S. housing crash will be portrayed. Lastly, a short conclusion 
will be offered. 
 
The Glass-Steagall Act from 1933 was made with the purpose of regulating the banking sector 
by making sure the bankers and investors only had influence to a certain point over the money 
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they invested. Over the years the numerous sections of the act were slowly, and bit by bit, 
loosened up by other financial policies. 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act  from 1999, allowed commercial and investment banks (and 
depository institutions, securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial service 
providers) to merge into huge companies. Some of them later became known as “Too Big To 
Fail”, insinuating that the companies were so large, that the government would not allow them to 
go bankrupt. Therefore, the creation of such large financial institutions has been criticized, as it 
is argued that [...] they are too big to effectively regulate and because they distort the financial 
markets (Skeel, 2010, p. 8). Additionally, these mergers opened up for the possibility for trading 
in i.a. mortgages and derivatives. 
Subsequently, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) from 2000 was passed, 
which essentially banned the regulation of derivatives. Initially the Clinton administration stated 
that there should be some regulation, but as the law was created in collaboration with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the regulation was ultimately left out. As such, the 
trading of derivatives continued to increase at a substantial rate. 
The American Dream Downpayment Initiative's (ADDI) from 2001 gave easier access to loans 
(even with a bad credit history), and together with the lowering of the Federal reserve rate, by the 
Federal Reserve, resulted in an increase in subprime mortgages. 
The suspension of net capital rule in 2004, which until then had prevented the broker units from 
holding larger amounts of riskier assets, paved way for banks to use the capital held in reserve 
for investments, and in that way could surpass the amount of debt they were limited to take on. 
Put differently, the banks were allowed to increase their leverage, i.e. the amount of borrowed 
money the banks used to pay for their investments. This was also partly because of the lowering 
of the Federal Reserve rate, as the interest rates were then lower and banks could therefore 
increase their debt without actually spending more money. 
 
The implementation of these policies was made from two different political offices and they 
were the most significant changes in the years leading up to 2007. There is a clear connection 
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between Friedman’s theory concerning minimal government intervention and the actions taken 
by the different government offices. The idea of the government should only [...] enforce the 
rules of the game (Friedman, 1963, p. 27) which can be seen in the slow deregulation of the 
housing market. This was done on the premise that government should [...] foster competitive 
markets (Friedman, 1963, p. 2) and be restricted to ensuring basic functions. 
In a [...] free private enterprise exchange economy (Friedman, 1963, p.13) there should be a 
separation of economic power and political power. From this point of view, the deregulating 
process was a natural one. It made sense to allow banks to merge, so business could expand. To 
give easier access to loans at a lower rate, and not restricting a “new” market (i.e. derivatives) 
were also natural choices in a free market looking for potential profit. Additionally, when there is 
a huge amount of capital “just lying around”, as with the net capital rule, gaining access to it and 
using it for further investments made sense. According to the Efficient market Hypothesis free 
movement of capital is paramount and […] markets move naturally only towards equilibrium 
(Cooper, 2008, p. 13), so initial fluctuations would only be expected. 
 
By implementing these changes in regulation, changes in selected Government-Supported 
Enterprises’ (GSEs’) focus also had to be made. In order to put into effect the ideologies of a free 
market and an “only regulatory” government, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were sanctioned to 
follow HUD’s housing goals and later the enterprises were to be the largest buyers of subprime 
mortgage loans. Through the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) the U.S. government 
also lowered the federal funds rate, essentially expanding the amount of capital that could be had 
for the same “price”. Furthermore, in accordance with the Efficient Market Hypothesis, […] any 
interference with market forces can at best achieve nothing (Cooper, 2008, p. 5). This was taken 
to heart by the U.S. government in the years leading up to 2007 likely because of the apparent 
rise in the economy. True supporters of a laissez-faire market would deny the need of these 
GSEs and especially the Federal Reserve altogether. Therefore, by turning the GSEs to have 
almost purely supporting roles in the housing market the government gave the signal for a more 
free market. 
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The underlying notion that a majority of the subprime mortgages were backed by a GSE was 
another signal that investing in subprime mortgages (and to an extent CDOs) was part of a free 
market system, and by extension a good idea. Especially when considering the low Federal 
interest rate […] were intended to encourage consumer spending and prop up a fragile economy 
(Williams, 2010, p. 118). When the two GSEs became “too big to fail”, the U.S. government had 
to make an official statement about backing them up in case of an economic collapse. This can 
only have strengthened the signal but considering this was done at a point in time where the U.S. 
housing market was at a highest, and the interest rate was at its lowest, it was considered a very 
good change. 
 
After the U.S. Housing Crash of 2007, it became clear that some of the changes had been for the 
worse. According to Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis it became apparent that the 
spreading feeling of security proved destructive and that […] Financial markets are not self-
optimizing, or stable, and certainly do not lead toward a natural optimal resource allocation 
(Cooper, 2008. P. 13). 
In hindsight, from a Minsky’s point of view, the statement that cash-flow in capitalism should be 
spent on further investment was stopped by the rising focus on profit from subprime mortgages. 
 
Conclusion 
The changes in legislation and the GSEs actions were made with keeping the financial growth in 
mind. But they were also of an ideological nature and from a Friedman’s and Efficient Market 
Hypothesis point of view they were necessary adjustments to get to an efficient competitive 
capitalistic system. And in the height of the U.S. housing market all the initial profit was 
construed as positive evidence on the efficiency of a free market. 
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2) What is the purpose of subprime mortgages and what role, if any, did they play 
in the crash of the U.S housing market? 
 
As a general definition of subprime mortgages has already been explained in one of the previous 
parts of the project, this section will move directly to the presentation of the function of subprime 
lending and the role it has played during the years leading up to the crash of the U.S. housing 
market in year 2007. Firstly, an explanation of the general role of subprime lending and what 
caused the increase of the number of subprime mortgages being originated will be provided. 
Secondly, a short description of the process of securitization and its role in subprime lending will 
be presented. Finally, the impact that subprime lending had on the housing market and the rise of 
the so-called housing “bubble” will be explained by using the theory of seven bubble stages by 
Hyman Minsky and topped with a short summary. 
 
Subprime mortgages were granted to individuals with so-called “bad credit history”, which was 
characterized, for instance, by occurring difficulties with repaying the loans on time or 
documentation of lower income (Mayer, Pence, 2008, p. 1). Subprime mortgages have a high 
interest rates and fees, in order to […] compensate the lender for the (additional) default risk 
associated with subprime loans (Hemert, 2008, p.22). 
Therefore, according to Schwartz, subprime loans were considered to be of a high default risk 
both for lenders and borrowers, especially compared to the best credit history: [...] The default 
risk for subprime mortgages was roughly five to six times that for prime mortgages (Schwartz, 
2009, p. 185).  
Before the abolishment of the Glass-Steagall Act, it was in the interest of the mortgage-lenders to 
issue their loans to customers they had faith in would pay their regular bills. However, when 
Glass-Steagall was no more, and the lenders of the mortgages were now also part investing bank 
and part insurance company, the merged company would gain more by issuing as many high-risk 
and high-cost mortgages as possible. As such, there was an increase in the subprime mortgages 
during the years prior to the crash of the U.S. housing market, namely between 2002 and 2007 
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when the house prices were increasing (Mian, Sufi, Trebbi, 2010, p.2). These subprime loans 
were mostly given to the low-income individuals by brokers whose main goal was to “sell” the 
biggest possible number of subprime loans as the preferred type of loan. With encouraging [...] 
low “teaser” rates, subprime home mortgage originations increased dramatically, rising from 8 
percent in 2001 to 21 percent in 2005. Eighty percent of these subprime loans were packaged 
into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) (Barth, 2009, p. 1). Only within 3 years, from 2000 to 
2003 the number of mortgage loans increased on average by 56% per year (Smith, Gjerstad, 
2009).  
 
During the next two years, together with increasing demand for house construction, the average 
price of a house in U.S. rose more than 8% after inflation, which was faster than in previous 
years and thereby accelerated even more the amount of subprime loans being originated (Schiller 
T., 2006). At his time, borrowers were granted risky loans even though they were often not able 
to repay them. 
 
According to Hyman Minsky and his theory of seven bubble stages, after the second stage of 
expansion during which, in a case of the U.S. housing market, prices started to grow, causing 
increasing interest in buying properties, the time of the third stage of euphoric behaviour starts. 
The third stage manifested itself in an increased number of risky investments being transacted, 
which took place due to ubiquitous optimism in relation to growing house prices and easy 
accessibility to the credit market, which for many was a promise of a better future. Just as 
Minsky’s stages suggest, there was an excessive optimism regarding issuing and borrowing 
money and the possibility of setbacks resulting from the reckless decisions were ignored. This 
was also largely determined by the fact that [subprime mortgages] were designed to be 
refinanced into lower, fixed-rate loans after a few years of house-price appreciation had 
generated some equity for the owner (Schwartz, 2009, p. 176). Thus, the borrowers of the 
subprime mortgages believed that subprime lending was a promising, and in many cases the only 
deal that would enable them to gain more than they ever could. As Mayer and Pence articulate it 
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[…] subprime loans appear to provide credit in locations where credit might be more difficult to 
obtain (Mayer, Pence, 2008, p. 3). Easily accessible loans, which thereby could be granted to 
nearly everyone who wished for them, led to Minsky’s 4th stage called over-trading, during 
which market speeded up and offered more properties for sell also for people who were to a large 
extent inexperienced borrowers, often guided by a desperate need to buy houses as increasing 
prices set up high expectations towards the future. 
Figure 1 illustrates the rapid growth of the subprime share of home mortgages during these years 
and time right after the decline began. 
 
Figure 2. Subprime lending in years 1995 – 2008. Source: Inside Mortgage Finance, Federal Reserve, Milken 
Institute. 
  
In the years leading up to the crash of the U.S. housing market, subprime mortgages made it 
possible for people to buy houses they could not afford with money they did not own. However, 
even if the borrowers would appear to be incapable of making their own payments, banks would 
still receive money and make profit through the loan transaction. The mortgage loans were 
secured by the state and outside the regulation, meaning that the banks were allowed to grant as 
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many mortgage loans as they wished to without any potential risk. The process which allowed 
particular institutions to hold the transactions without the spectrum of threat was the process of 
securitization, during which an institution issuing mortgages could chose to gather the mortgages 
in its portfolio in a trust, i.e. a company that manages financial matters on the behalf of the client. 
Both the spike in the issuing of mortgage loans, and the increased securitization of those 
mortgages can be seen in the following graph: 
 
Figure 3. Subprime mortgage originations. Source: Inside Mortgage Finance 
 
The mortgages are thus put together in one pool called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 
and the institution will then […] issue securities [i.e. a derivate], against the assets of the trust 
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[…] (Stulz, 2004, p. 13). The pool of mortgages will then be sold in smaller pieces to various 
investors, and as such [...] removes interest risk from the books of the banks by shifting the risk 
[…] to the buyer of the MBS [Mortgage-Backed Security] or CMO/CDO [Collateralized 
Mortgage Obligation/Collateralized Debt Obligation] (Schwartz, 2009, p. 102). 
This process of securitization can be illustrated in this way: 
 
Figure 4. The securitization process. 
 
1) A person wishes to buy a home, and therefore takes e.g. a subprime mortgage loan 2) at a 
lending institute. The lending institute 3), wanting to achieve the greatest profit, sells the 
subprime mortgage to an investment bank 4), before the borrower has a chance to default (this 
step will be elaborated later on). The investment bank 5), gathers the various bought debt in so-
called Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), which the investment bank then sells in smaller 
pieces 6), and with believed scattered risk, to investors 7). 
 
These CDOs are given a rating, to evaluate the risk. This rating is done by rating agencies, which 
are paid by the investment banks (Skeel, 2010, p. 6). As such, it is possible for CDOs consisting 
purely of the high-risk subprime mortgages, to get the highest rating of AAA. 
Footnote: In this project, the role of the credit rating agencies will not be further dealt with, apart 
from the short notion that the […] the credit rating agencies […] did a notoriously poor job with 
the mortgage-related securities […] handing out investment grade ratings to many securities 
that later defaulted (Skeel, 2010, p. 6). 
 
An example of the magnitude of securitization might be the New Century Financial Corporation, 
which is one of the largest subprime lenders in the U.S. In the second quarter of 2006, it had 
3949 subprime loans securitized, with principal of $881 million (Ashcraft, Schuermann, 2008, p. 
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13). Despite the advantages of securitization, such as the possibility for investors to choose the 
level of investment and risk from the pool of mortgages in the fund, and the increased liquidity 
of the market, there are notable disadvantages associated with securitization. The process of 
securitization is often too complicated, thus limiting the transparency making it difficult for 
investors to monitor the associated risk, as securitization made the CDOs appear less risky to the 
investors than they actually were. 
It was in the interest of the investment banks to get rid of the loan inventory before the borrowers 
started to default. A problem the investment banks would face was […] if the securitization 
machine slowed down (Williams, 2010, p. 123). If the loans remained […] on the books longer 
than anticipated (Williams, 2010, p. 123), the investment bank […] would become the subject to 
increased price and default risks (Williams, 2010, p. 123). In addition to that, CDOs (and MBSs) 
were mostly privately labeled, opposed to packed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and because 
of that were often [...] synthetic products containing bits and pieces of various mortgages 
(Schwartz, 2009, p. 185). This enables a single default of a mortgage to affect several CDOs, 
despite the original logic behind fusing [...] a wide range of CDOs was to limit the risk from any 
single default, instead of allowing one defaulter to contaminate many CDOs (Schwartz, 2009, p. 
185). From what started out as a high-risk subprime mortgage loan, then re-packed as a CDO, 
with possible AAA rating, and finally sold to investors, who possibly had no idea what they were 
actually buying. 
 
  
Conclusion 
During the years leading up to the crash of the U.S. housing market, subprime lending was a 
common practice distributed on a large scale among Americans who originally could not afford 
buying a property. High interest rates and risk associated with this type of loan did not deter 
potential borrowers, and subprime loan policy continued until the house prices reached their 
maximum in 2006 and started to decline dramatically when they reached the point they could not 
reflect demand and supply in the market anymore. 
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Easy accessibility of mortgage loans caused an excessive and in fact dangerous optimism among 
U.S. citizens, which resulted in a huge number of inexperienced people entering the house 
market. Therefore, it contributed to the over-construction of houses and consequently to market 
crash, during which thousands of people were forced to leave their houses after what Minsky 
called the 7th stage of revulsion. During this stage of panic borrowers started to notice that the 
bubble had gone too far but it was too late for them to escape from the market with no loss.  
What was the role of subprime mortgages in the course of the U.S housing market crash in 2007?  
The usage of the high-risk subprime mortgages […] bridged the gap between new entrants’ weak 
incomes and rising home prices (Schwartz, 2009, p. 19). Furthermore, according to Baker [...] 
huge amounts of money on mortgages caused destabilization and therefore the crisis of the 
financial system within which U.S. economy lost almost $400 billion in consumption demand, 
which is 2.5 % of GDP in today’s economy (Baker, 2013). Even though stating that subprime 
lending has been the factor which led directly to the crash of the housing market and financial 
crisis, might be a bit too far reaching assumption, it was definitely a driver for the increasing 
involvement of the U.S. society in the property market. It fuelled the tremendous growth in the 
number of bank transactions and was a factor, which led to significant changes in the financial 
situation of the U.S.  
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3) In relation to the issue of subprime mortgages, how are derivatives relevant 
when investigating the crash of the U.S. housing market? 
As the concept of derivatives has already been explained in the definition section of this project, 
the following part will give account for what derivatives mean for the financial market, wherein 
the problems related to the use of derivatives will be explained and finally how they are related 
to the crash of the U.S. housing market. 
There are different opinions regarding what function derivatives play in the financial market. 
Some find derivatives to be […] important in ensuring continuity in the production cycle 
(Alessandrini, 2011, p. 444), where derivatives […] make it possible to hedge risks that 
otherwise would be unhedgeable, and as such making the […] markets more complete (Stulz, 
2004, p. 15). Because of this, Stulz argues, […] the economy is more productive and welfare is 
higher (Stulz, 2004, p. 15) because of the usage of derivatives. 
Others disagree; in 2002, Warren Buffet, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway and renowned 
businessman, described derivatives as […] financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying 
dangers which, while latent, are potentially lethal (Warren Buffet, 2002, p. 15), and he is not 
alone in this opinion. Both before and after the crash of the U.S housing market, derivatives were 
condemned to be dangerous financial contracts, which only added to […] the growing complexity 
of the financial system (Davies, 2010, p. 138). It was argued that derivatives jeopardizes the 
financial system, and must be removed as standard practice or heavily regulated (Alessandrini, 
2011, p. 442). 
One of the core elements when discussing derivatives is Over-The-Counter (OTC) trading, 
which was briefly mentioned in the description of forward contracts. OTC trading […] means 
that two parties agree on a trade without meeting through an organized exchange (Stulz, 2004, 
p. 10). Because of the private handling, this method of trade is considered decentralized and 
unregulated, especially because […] the parties are not required to report their transactions 
(Stulz, 2004, p. 11). As such, when the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) estimated the 
size of the trading in OTC derivatives had increased from approximately $220.000 billion in 
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2004 to $516.000 billion in 2007 (BIS, 2007, p. 10), the actual amount of derivatives is 
uncertain. 
What has also proved difficult is estimating the value of such derivatives. The so-called Black-
Scholes formula, developed in 1973, […] was found useful to price, evaluate the risk of, and 
hedge most derivatives (Stulz, 2004, p. 10). The Black-Scholes formula’s first assumption about 
the market is that is has no friction, subsequently assuming that […] the stock price moves 
smoothly over time – it never jumps. (Stulz, 2004, p. 20), but as Stulz immediately remarks; […] 
in the real world, departures from these assumptions are significant (Stulz, 2004, pp. 20-21) […] 
and that it […] is a powerful simplifying assumption (Stulz, 2004, p. 14). However, as there has 
been created no model to replace it, the Black-Scholes formula remains. 
 
As a result of that, […] even relatively simple derivatives contracts can be misvalued 
substantially (Stulz, 2004, p. 21), where even the experts within the field are disagreeing on the 
estimation of derivatives, with an […] average percentage by which the highest bid price 
exceeded the low bit was 63 percent (Stulz, 2004, p. 21). Furthermore, there is a disagreement on 
whether the derivatives influence the price of the underlying asset, upon which it is supposed to 
be based. Stulz clearly states that […] there does not seem compelling evidence at this time that 
the introduction of derivatives trading on an underlying increases permanently the volatility of 
the return of the underlying (Stulz, 2004, p. 16). Whereas Alessandrini argues that derivatives 
[…] do not merely derive their value from that of the underlying asset but also participate in the 
making of that value (Alessandrini, 2011, p. 442). Subsequently stating that […] the value of a 
financial derivative does not derive from the value of the underlying asset, but from the trend of 
that value in the market (Alessandrini, 2011, p. 445). 
  
So why were OTC derivatives not regulated as the exchange traded derivatives? This was 
brought to question by the Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC), and its chairwoman 
Brooksley Born, in 1998 where the CFTC issued a release addressed to the U.S Congress and the 
then-president Clinton, regarding the Over-The-Counter Derivatives. In the release, the CFTC 
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acknowledges that OTC derivatives have significant economic purposes, but nonetheless […] 
can present significant risks if misused or misunderstood by market participants (CFTC1, 1998, 
under “Description of Over-the-Counter Products and Markets”). Additionally, the release calls 
attention to the fact that the CFTC has no authority to require recordkeeping, documentation or 
the like. The release urges the receivers to take action and give the CFTC permission to regulate 
the OTC derivatives, and we regard this release as an example of stage five in Minsky’s bubble 
theory “Market Reversal”.  
As stage five also states, this did not come to pass. Together with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), President Clinton passed the Commodities Futures Modernization Act 
(CFMA) of 2000, and thus the CFTC was banned from regulating OTC derivatives. 
  
The OTC derivatives consists mostly of swaps, e.g. currency-exchange swaps or credit-default 
swaps. In the case of the U.S. housing market, the problem was based in the credit-default swaps, 
the so-called CDSs. The CDSs are best understood when seen in correlation with the 
securitizations-illustration from the previous working question. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The process of the credit-default swaps. 
 
After the investors have purchased parts or entire CDOs, the investors can subsequently ensure 
themselves from risk by acquiring credit protection through a CDS 8). 
These are sold by an insurance corporation 9), and the agreement usually entails that the investor 
pays the insurance corporation an agreed fee at regular intervals, and if the CDO defaults, the 
insurance corporation compensate the losses. However, speculators 11) have the opportunity to 
also buy CDSs and bet against CDOs they themselves did not own 10). 
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In relation to the case of the U.S. housing market, the subprime mortgages, were sold as high-
rated CDOs to investors, who secured the subprime-CDOs with credit-default swaps. […] These 
mortgage-related products were still relatively new and lacked a long, observable track record 
(Williams, 2010, p. 102), and as such had risks associated with the process. One kind, being the 
risk of default from the borrowers of the mortgage loans. Another being that the insurance 
corporations […] were not required to set aside capital reserves to honor [the CDOs] (Williams, 
2010, pp. 141-142). 
 
Up to and including 2005, the U.S housing prices increased each year, as seen in figure 6; but 
that was not to last. In November 2005, market research from Deutche Bank […] suggested that 
all that was required for a collapse of the securitized mortgage market was a failure of house 
prices to continue rising (Kregel, 2011, p. 237). As such, when the housing prices dropped, and 
the resulting defaults of mortgages spiked as seen in figure X, the value of the securities 
decreased dramatically.  
 
 
Figure 6. U.S. Housing Prices 1997-2012. 
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Figure 7. Loans entering foreclosure 1998-2007. 
 
However, certain actors, both producers of the securitized instruments and professionals in the 
financial world (e.g. investors and fund managers), […] identified the risks of securitisation of 
subprime mortgages [and] recognised that they were bound to explode (Kregel, 2011, pp. 237-
238). They consequently attempted […] to profit from their insights by selling short what they 
considered the most overpriced tranches of collateralised mortgage obligations (Kregel, 2011, 
pp. 237-238). An example of this is the investment-banking firm Goldmann Sachs, who in 2006 
started to build a large short position, i.e. started to sell its assets, as they expected that the assets 
would decrease in value (Kregel, 2011, p. 237). Goldman Sachs would later be sued by the SEC 
for allegedly having […] defrauded investors by failing to tell them that the mortgage-related 
investments it had sold them were pricked in part by a hedge fund that was betting that the 
mortgages would default (Skeel, 2010, p. 3). 
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In the paper “Should We Fear Derivatives?” from 2004, the author R. M. Stulz explains the then 
believed advantages and disadvantages concerning derivatives. Despite his own argument that it 
is very difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the correct value of derivatives, Stulz concludes 
that the firms using derivatives are now, in time of writing, more educated in the use of 
derivatives, and they are less likely to make irrational choices (Stulz, 2004, p. 27). 
Stulz therefore estimates that the enclosed risks do, […] by any standard, seem manageable 
(Stulz, 2004, p. 28). The firms which engaged in the derivatives market must have very clear and 
distinct policies regarding their use of derivatives (Stulz, 2004, p. 34), but all in all, Stulz 
believes that […] the conventional measure suggest that no large bank or investment bank is 
seriously at risk because of its derivatives holdings (Stulz, 2004, p. 29). 
However, before discrediting Stulz’s work, which is easy when you have the power of hindsight, 
Stulz does, although rather vague, express the concern of risk measurement, as the methods used 
at the time did not […] capture risks we do not know matter (Stulz, 2004, p. 29). With that in 
mind, his conclusion still remains; So, should we fear derivatives? The answer is no (Stulz, 2004, 
p. 34). 
Since 2004, things have changed. 
  
Conclusion 
Derivatives are known to be of various sizes and shapes, and generally, the intention behind the 
usage of derivatives was to make it possible for firms to hedge themselves against price 
instability. However, in the years leading up to the crash of the U.S. housing market, the 
increased use of credit-default swaps, traded Over-The-Counter, with no regulation from 
government agencies, exploded. 
Over-The-Counter derivatives, such as credit-default-swaps, were not included in the regulatory 
authority of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and were despite the wishes of the 
commission itself, banned from regulating the OTC derivatives in the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000. As such, in the years leading up to the crash of the U.S. housing 
market, the OTC derivatives expanded significantly, still with no regulation. 
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Due to the use and process of credit-default swaps, derivatives created the opportunity to 
distribute seemingly well-managed risk. However, this was dependent on the continuing increase 
of the housing prices. As the U.S. house prices started to diminish, there was an increase in 
defaults of the subprime mortgages, which were used to buy the houses with no more value. As 
the mortgages went into foreclosure, as seen in figure X, the subprime mortgage-backed credit-
default swaps defaulted as well, later resulting in the defaults of major insurance corporations. 
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7) Conclusion 
 
To what extent did the subprime mortgages and changes in regulation impact the rise and 
crash of the U.S. housing market in the years leading up to 2007? 
 
In a capitalistic society, the pursuit of financial gain is a must, and obtaining a free-as-possible 
market is only natural. The ideology of an efficient competitive capitalistic system the 
government’s only role, in regards to its financial sector, is a purely custodian one. As of 2007 in 
the United States of America, there had been numerous changes in the regulation of its housing 
market, often as a reflection of the contemporary political administration, but the underlying 
quest for economic growth had become an accepted ideology. 
The idea of owning your own home has been a part of the American identity for a long time and 
the idea of taking a mortgage is an understandable option, for both lender and borrower, if a 
majority owns their own homes. So when the subprime mortgages became more available it 
automatically opened further up for new customers of the lending market while fuelling the 
ideology of a freer market. As such, in the years leading up to 2007, that was considered a 
natural and accepted thing in the U.S. Subprime mortgages were a way for low-income citizens 
to get loans and by extension more were able to buy houses and the rise in both supply and 
demand was seen in a very positive light. 
When large amounts of the subprime mortgages were implicitly (and later officially) backed up 
by the U.S. government they were understandably viewed as a smart investment. This led to 
more investors, some more experienced than others, and the pursuit of profit expanded. As the 
“adventure” seemed to go on further deregulation was implemented and then it was possible for 
bright entrepreneurs to get creative. The derivatives market, although not a new subject, was a 
way for multi-faceted finance enterprises to become very innovative. With less and less 
regulation and more and more possibility of profit, the subprime mortgage and derivatives 
market essentially became the land of opportunity. The housing market had become a free 
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market and the gigantic financial businesses that understood to navigate this Wild West grew in 
their already considerable size and wealth. Unfortunately, the foundation for this market was a 
steady flow of deposits from a group of people whose ability to meet the required payments was 
already strained. 
Therefore, when the payments slowly stopped, the whole system came crashing down. 
 
So, to what extent did the subprime mortgages and changes in regulation impact the rise and 
crash of the U.S. housing market in the years leading up to 2007? 
With a mix of a less-regulated market, a higher “supply” of house loans to a lower-income 
population and an increasing number of “creative” ways to deal with these loans, a crash was 
unavoidable. Alone, these factors would not have been enough to cause a national crisis but put 
together the situation became too complex and unmanageable. The ideology of a more free 
market believed that opening up for loans for more people would result in the rise of economic 
wealth, but resulted in too much incentive for profit. In other words, the extent of their impact on 
the rise and crash of the U.S. housing market was huge when combined. The change in 
regulation opened up for a market, which caused an increase in subprime mortgages, and in turn, 
created a false sense of growth in the housing market. In extension, the changes in regulation 
also made it possible for big financial corporations to profit from the trade of debt.   
In conclusion, the subprime mortgages and the changes in regulation was a chain of mutually-
enforcing gateways to a market whose inflation of prices was mistakenly viewed as a purely 
positive thing, and whose inevitable burst would have long-term repercussions. 
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8) Perspective 
In this chapter, firstly, we will explain our thoughts behind our wording of the time frame of the 
project. Secondly, we will discuss what we possibly could have included in the project; bubble 
theory, the aftermath of the crash of the U.S. housing market with the 2007 OECD Economic 
Outlook, with the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and finally the concept of capitalism. 
  
To attempt to encompass all the aspects of the crash of the U.S. housing market in 2007, the 
project would go beyond its imposed restrictions, so we felt the need to narrow our focus a great 
deal, and simply disregard certain areas of relevance. There were enough of aspects to choose 
from, both before and after the crash. 
If we had chosen to word our problem formulation to simply “before the crash” instead of “the 
years leading up to the crash” there would be no limit as to what to include. Though we include 
legislation dating all the way back to 1933, we maintain our chief focus on the legislation closest 
to the crash. Otherwise, as we also had to ask ourselves several times in the process of writing 
the project, when is the limit? 
Initially we had chosen a very specific time frame for the project; the years 2002-2007. We did 
this, because we were starting to realize the wide range of legislation, numbers, policies, 
development of technology, which all had a part to play in the events we investigated. However, 
with choosing “the years leading up to the crash”, we gave ourselves the possibility to select 
what we felt was most relevant to the project. 
  
The crash of the U.S. housing market is also referred to as the U.S. housing bubble. It would 
have been useful and constructive to include a theory on the creation of bubbles. We envisage 
that such a theory would include a general definition of a bubble, the characteristics of bubbles 
of various kinds, and finally what factors indicate that the issue at hand is a bubble or something 
else. This would possibly have given us another tool to strengthen the arguments we make in our 
analysis and final conclusion. 
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In 2007, as the housing crash was erupting throughout the United States, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) released its Economic Outlook. In it, the 
OECD notes, that the U.S. “slowdown” of recently had not been a sign of more to come, or as 
the OECD puts it: […] was not heralding a period of worldwide economic weakness (OECD, 
2007, p. 7). Instead, the OECD predicted that the U.S. would experience […] a “smooth” 
rebalancing (OECD, 2007, p. 7), stating that […] recent developments have broadly confirmed 
this prognosis (OECD, 2007, p. 7). The OECD ends with envisaging a bright future for the 
economy: […] In line with recent trends, sustained growth in OECD economies would be 
underpinned by strong job creation and falling unemployment (OECD, 2007, p. 7). 
This release is a clear example of how the economic models of the time were largely incorrect 
and faulty, as the world would find itself in a global recession within the next year. 
 
Another aspect, which perhaps would have given a more harmonized character to the project, is 
if we had had the capacity to include some of legislative changes that were made in the aftermath 
of the crash. An example of that is the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, passed by President Barack 
Obama. The Dodd-Frank Act has the general objective of […] putting up brand-new regulatory 
structures in place for both the instruments and the institutions of the financial world (Skeel, 
2010, p. 3), including the requirement that […] derivatives be cleared and traded on exchanges 
(Skeel, 2010, p. 4). As such, this would have been a good link to our presentation of the 
derivatives. Though, had we chosen to do so, the focus would increasingly have been on 
derivatives and their relation to the regulations, a focus which would have been a similar but 
ultimately different project. Furthermore, focusing purely on the financial institutions and their 
role could easily have been expanded and been a project in itself. Additionally, the Dodd-Frank 
Act in itself is a huge piece of legislation, and would too have been a suitable subject for a 
project in itself. 
 
Initially, when we started to work on this project, we wanted to understand “the capitalistic 
system and its failures”. Obviously, this is a huge and vague initial standpoint, however we 
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would have liked to be able to have the discussion of the failures of the current semi-capitalistic 
system. We say “semi” as we have come to understand that pure capitalism and the current 
system are not duplicates. Subsequently, we would have had discussed the concept of financial 
capitalism compared to e.g. industrial capitalism. 
We especially found the notion of “socializing the risks and privatizing the gains” as a very 
interesting starting point, but in the end chose to, again, limit our area of focus.  
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